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Summary: 
The essay provides an overview of the main lines of argument that run through 
the work of Hans Aarsleff. The emphasis is on the history of language theory as 
an integral part of intellectual history. 
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In the preface to the second edition of his first book, The Study of Language in 
England, 1780-1860, Hans Aarsleff suggests that its main virtue was that it had 
taken a new approach to its subject when the work first appeared in 1967. This 
approach had subsequently become generally accepted so that the history of 
language  
was moved into the province of intellectual history, based on the well-
founded thesis … that the study of language in any period is intertwined 
with events in the larger cultural context, such as developments in natural 
science, in philosophy, and even in political and religious thought.1  
This is an entirely accurate assessment, to which one should add that The Study 
of Language in England and Aarsleff’s subsequent work were driving forces in 
this development towards what we now call contextualist intellectual history. 
However, it is telling that Aarsleff’s methodological statement was made in 
retrospect, for contextualism has for him always been an approach and a 
practice, rather than a theory or a programme.  Although in later years he has 
occasionally expressed an appreciation of Wittgenstein’s idea of language as a 
feature of life forms, he has never committed himself to a definite philosophy of 
language as the basis for a historiographical method. Contextualism was and is 
                                                        
1 Hans Aarsleff, The Study of Language in England, 1780-1860, 2nd ed., (London: 
The Athlone Press, 1983), vii. 
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for Aarsleff rather a matter of good empirical history in accordance with the 
sound injunction, ‘beyond context, beyond criticism’. Again and again, he has 
showed how scholars, past and present, by neglecting the wider contexts in 
which ideas of language have been articulated have deprived themselves of 
critical checks on their work. 
 
Aarsleff’s transformation of the history of the study of language into a branch of 
modern intellectual history did in fact coincide even more precisely with the 
well-known articulations of the new programme in Cambridge, especially by 
John Pocock and Quentin Skinner.2 We find it already in the doctoral dissertation 
that Aarsleff wrote in the 1950s and completed in 1960.3 As indicated by the 
shared title, this dissertation was the basis for the subsequent book, and in both 
he sought to replace the dominant view of historical conceptions of language. In 
so far as these were not considered irrelevant by modern linguists, they 
consisted, he found, of a simplistic line-up of what was considered contributions 
to or anticipations of contemporary ideasn – in other words a teleological 
construction of a useful past that might function as an introduction to 
contemporary studies. This critical starting point was of course one he shared 
with the ‘Cambridge School’ in the history of political thought, but there is a 
particularly close similarity to what Aarsleff’s friend, Donald Winch, a few years 
later sought to achieve for the history of economic thought.4 In both disciplines, 
an impoverished canon of works was all that survived in a prevailing scientism 
that saw the big names of the past as little more than fall-guys for modern 
professional work. Aarsleff also pointed to new work in the history of science, 
including that of the contemporary Thomas Kuhn, as a source of inspiration and 
                                                        
2 See John Pocock,  Political Thought and History. Essays on Theory and Method 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), ch. 8; Quentin Skinner, Visions 
of Politics, vol. 1, Regarding Method (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2002); Richard Whatmore, What is Intellectual History? (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
2016), 39-44 and 58-66. 
3 Hans Aarsleff, ‘The Study of Language in England, 1780-1860’, (Ph. D. diss., 
University of Minnesota, 1960). 
4 See Donald Winch, ‘Intellectual History and the History of Economics’, in 
Companion to Intellectual History, ed. Richard Whatmore and Brian Young, 
(Oxford: Whiley-Blackwell, 2016), ch. 13.  
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emulation. In the case of Aarsleff’s task it had to begin with the adoption of a 
broader label; ‘linguistics’ was a nineteenth-century neologism and thus to write 
the history of earlier efforts as the history of linguistics was anachronistic from 
the start. As a matter of history, it had to be ‘the study of language’ so as to signal 
a much broader human concern. 
 
Although Aarsleff’s work is deeply contextual, it is by no means devoid of grand 
vistas. To the contrary, he ends up with an extraordinarily wide sweep of 
intellectual history in which ideas of language are crucial. However, this was not 
his starting-point but a clear-sightedness achieved through the construction of 
multiple interlocking or overlapping contexts. The result has been the raising of  
serious question marks over some of the most entrenched categories used to 
organise intellectual history in general and language history in particular from 
Bacon to modern structuralism.  These categories include British versus 
Continental, Lockean versus Cartesian; German historicism versus French (or 
Enlightenment) rationalism; and Enlightenment versus Counter-Enlightenment; 
along with Sausurean structuralism; and Cartesian linguistics – to mention the 
most obvious. Aarsleff achieved these effects in a piecemeal manner and not by a 
linear presentation. Just like David Hume followed the practice of witches in 
saying their prayers backwards by beginning his History of England with the 
most recent period, so Aarsleff began his historical trajectory with the 
nineteenth century and then built up his case, or rather cases, from the 
preceeding two centuries.5  
 
Aarsleff’s starting point was deceptively particular: what was the view of 
language that lay behind the creation between the 1860s and the 1920s of the 
New English Dictionary that in time became the Oxford English Dictionary? The 
                                                        
5 In fact, much of the earlier history is foreshadowed in chapter 1 of The Study of 
Language in England and in the corresponding chapter of its dissertation 
forerunner, but it is only worked out in detail in the essays collected in Hans 
Aarsleff, From Locke to Saussure: Essays on the Study of Language and Intellectual 
History, (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1982), and in several 
later papers, culminating in the large essay on Wilhelm von Humboldt below. 
Aarsleff explains his way of working at length in the introduction to From Locke 
to Saussure. 
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short answer is, a view of language as a human institution that has its own 
history and has to be understood in historical terms – but the history of how the 
historical view of language was acquired in England was intricate indeed. As 
Aarsleff tells it, it is a story of how two sharply opposed philosophies of language 
vied for predominance from the closing decade of the eighteenth century until 
around 1860. On one side was a line of argument that had been decisively 
shaped by John Horne Tooke and which essentially made language an aspect of 
psychology, a view that was then forcefully reinforced by the intellectual 
descendants of the associationists David Hartley and Joseph Priestley and by the 
utilitarians, especially James Mill, in the theory of the mind. On the other side 
was the historical view of language that eventually won out, and Aarsleff devotes 
much attention to the multiple channels by which this view came to the fore in 
English intellectual life and of how this happened only after a prolonged 
intellectual and institutional struggle. Aarsleff focuses on two main sources of 
the relevant linguistic historicism; one was the work of Sir William Jones, which 
was exactly contemporary with that of Horne Tooke but had a harder time being 
heard in England than on the Continent. It was here that Aarsleff identified the 
second source of direct influence in England, namely the historical approaches 
developed by Danish and German thinkers, especially Rasmus Rask, N. F. S. 
Grundtvig, Johann David Michaelis, Franz Bopp and Jacob Grimm, all of whom 
had a decisive impact.6 
 
So far, so good. But both of the opposing views of language had historically 
conditioned complexities of considerable depth, which Aarsleff had begun to 
analyse and explain in The Study of Language in England and which have been 
the focus of his subsequent extensive oeuvre. In the early work he had already 
explained how both the associationists’ and Horne Tooke’s reduction of language 
to part of our mental furniture was a serious perversion of John Locke’s view of 
language and, indeed, of his philosophy as a whole. Aarsleff came early to the 
view that in general Locke had been fundamentally misunderstood and that a 
                                                        
6 Aarselff’s personnel is much larger and of course he includes in his high 
appreciation of Göttingen an account of the importance of Herder in the German 
context. 
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proper reading of him was key to understanding the nature and central role of 
language in subsequent philosophy. In harmony with the Christian idea of 
original sin, Locke’s basic suggestion was that humanity was deprived of any 
divinely guaranteed correlation between the objects of understanding, the ideas 
of the mind and the words tying both together. In one of his boldest moves, 
Aarsleff argued that this was the main point of Locke’s criticism of innatism and 
nothing to do in particular with Descartes. To the contrary, Locke was himself a 
rationalist, for while he had rejected the possibility that the human mind is 
issued with innate ideas and the corresponding Adamic language, he had always 
affirmed that the mind has innate intellectual powers. Entirely in keeping with 
Descartes, Locke saw the exercise of these powers as ideally a language-free 
mental discourse. However, this ideal could never be achieved in practical 
human reasoning, and in acknowledging this Locke in fact gave some important 
clues towards a theory that eventually would remedy his own inability to find a 
theoretically coherent account of language. Thus he not only saw that the lack of 
a natural or divine link between words and what they designate entailed that 
words must stem from humans; he also understood that language was a public 
medium and therefore bound to change over time. So despite his theoretical 
difficulties, Locke said enough to make it impossible to read him as a simple 
associationist in the theory of language, which was nevertheless what happened, 
and Aarsleff traced this distortion through the eighteenth century up to the point 
where he had started this story – Horne Tooke, James Mill and their like.  
 
Aarsleff put his reading of Locke into the context of the new view of science 
propagated by the Royal Society, on several of whose leading figures he did 
original work. The basic point was that if the language of Adam had been lost to 
humanity in its current state and had to be replaced with human tongues, then 
language was a source of nescience and only an empirical study of the book of 
nature could lead to truth. In other words, language was outside of nature and 
had to be studied on its own terms. There was no shortage of attempts to pull 
language back into the realm of nature, whether nature in the form of the 
divinely instituted mind, or nature as the law-bound system accounted for by 
associationists and materialists. But the important point was that the Lockean 
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view threw open the possibility that language could be understood as a sui 
generis factor in the life of humanity, namely as what Aarsleff called the first 
social institution. This possibility was brought nearer by a very different context 
for the consideration of language, namely the cultivation – especially in France 
from the late seventeenth century onwards – of the set of connected arts 
consisting of opera, dance and mime, and closely associated with those a renewal 
of oratory through a new rhetoric. These practices and the theoretical attention 
to them conveyed the idea of language as expressive of sentiments and as a 
matter of social interaction. It is here that modern ideas of sympathy and 
sociability as the cement of social life and of language as action that expresses 
such sentiments turn up. The core of Aarsleff’s post-Lockean story is that this 
‘expressivist’ idea of language was theorised by a number of thinkers right 
through the eighteenth century as an answer to the problem of how to 
understand language as the basic social institution.  
 
On Aarsleff’s view, pioneering efforts in this chain of arguments were made by 
Antoine Arnauld and Pierre Nicole, Bernard Lamy, Fénelon, Jean-Baptiste Du Bos 
and George Berkeley, and of course the theory of sympathy reached its greatest 
articulation in David Hume and Adam Smith. But the key figure in Aarsleff’s 
account is Étienne Bonnot de Condillac, and it is one of Aarsleff’s major 
achievements to have established the Frenchman as a thinker of great 
intellectual stature. Often taken to be no more than an abbreviated French 
version of Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Condillac’s Essai sur 
l’origine des connaissances humaines (1746) was, on Aarsleff’s reading, a radically 
different work. 7 It was not about the human understanding but about human 
knowledge, namely its origins, and these were essentially the human ability to 
use language. Condillac had never had the chicken-or-egg problems concerning 
language and thought and concerning language and society that Rousseau 
formulated several years later in the first part of the Discours sur l’origine et les 
                                                        
7 When Aarsleff undertook a modern English translation of Condillac’s work, he 
followed the eighteenth-century translation in using the title, An Essay on the 
Origin of Human Knowledge; see Hans Aarsleff, introduction to Étienne Bonnot de 
Condillac, An Essay on the Origin of Human Knowledge, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001), xvii-xviii. 
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fondemens de l’inégalité parmi des hommes (1755), only then to solve them in the 
second part with basically the same line of argument as that put forward by 
Condillac. A recognisably human life is always social to some degree, at least out 
of sheer need. This means that there will always be spectators, to use Smith’s 
language, to our expressive reactions to our surroundings, whether these 
reactions be oral or behavioural, and some of these expressive reactions will be 
perceived as signs by the spectators – signs of objects of fear, attraction, or 
whatever. This signing function of certain forms of expressive behaviour can in 
turn be adopted deliberately, so that art imitates nature to create actual 
communication, whether between different persons or between one person’s 
earlier and later selves. This is the basis for Condillac’s detailed analysis of 
mental processes as inherently linguistic in character, and it is thus an account 
that is far from reducing language to animalistic cries - as had commonly been 
thought by interpreters – but that rather makes it key to a view of knowledge as 
a process of interpersonal exchange that is driven by the full variety of human 
interests or ‘passions’.  
 
Aarsleff emphasises how this organicist account contrasts with the common idea 
of the Enlightenment as rationalistic and mechanistic.8 It makes it intelligible 
how Condillac had to reject universal grammar’s rationalistic idea that there is a 
natural word order and how he could see the flexibility of word order 
(‘inversion’) in languages such as Latin as more natural than the rigid French in 
the sense that the former was better able to capture – express – the variety of 
human sentiments. It was this role of inversion that gave rise to the idea that ‘the 
language of action’ had a vitality that Diderot called energy, a notion that plays a 
central role in Aarsleff’s analysis of von Humboldt’s later development of his 
                                                        
8 In recent work the same charicature has been rejected on the basis of the life 
sciences in the Enlightenment, but without mention of either Condillac or 
Aarsleff’s much earlier organicist interpretation; see H. P. Reill, Vitalizing Nature 
in the Enlightenment, (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California 
Press, 2005). Aarsleff has particular fun with the common misconception that 
Condillac’s famous speechless statue is representative of his view of human 
nature; one might suggest that it has an argumentative function similar to 
Rousseau’s radically isolated natural humans, except that the Abbé did not take it 
quite so seriously. 
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theory of language. The organic and holistic understanding of the linguistic 
community that Condillac developed - and which Denis Diderot adopted - led 
him to see language as key to the character and ‘genius’ of a people, and to see 
the literary forms that were most expressive, namely poetry, as the most 
important in this regard. 
 
Aarsleff’s thesis is that through Condillac’s Essai and its elaboration in his 
subsequent work, as well as in the work of Diderot, Turgot and others a socio-
historical view of language had been established that was fundamental to the 
philosophy of language throughout the rest of the eighteenth century and into 
the nineteenth. It was by no means a linear development, and much of Aarsleff’s 
work consists of the recreation of intellectual episodes in which the Condillacian 
idea was half understood, misunderstood or rejected with hostility, as well as 
ones in which it was elaborated. In Germany Aarsleff emphasises the value of 
Johann David Michaëlis’ influential account of language as part of social practices 
and hence as a subject that has to be studied historically.9 But at the same time 
there was an important restatement by Johann Peter Süssmilch of the traditional 
idea that language was a divine institution. In Scotland where the attention to 
language was particularly close, Adam Smith developed the most sophisticated 
theory of sympathy as the basis for sociability, yet his explicit theory of language 
had no place for social relations and was a rather rationalistic exercise out of 
touch with current ideas. In odd contrast, the Common Sense philosopher 
Thomas Reid had the most lucid conception of the language of action, while his 
eclectic follower, Dugald Stewart, formulated the sharpest and most coherent 
criticism of the reactionary development in British linguistic thought that was, as 
mentioned earlier, due (in particular) to Horne Tooke. However, the effective 
cause of change only came later and from abroad through the works and the 
personal influence of the Danish and German thinkers also referred to earlier. 
 
                                                        
9 For a recent study very much in Aarsleff’s mould, see Avi Lifschitz, Language 
and Enlightenment: The Berlin Debate of the Eighteenth Century, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012). 
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The aspect of Aarsleff’s general thesis that has attracted most attention is 
undoubtedly his account of Herder and von Humboldt. It was, he suggests, 
Condillac who so excited the young Herder in his early work on language in the 
1770s, and it was the dominance of the idéologues’ Condillacan approach that so 
challenged the young von Humboldt when he arrived in Paris at the end of the 
1790s. It is in this part of the story that Aarsleff has repeatedly run into scholarly 
controversy; the idea that these two luminaries in many respects were 
dependent on the ideas of other thinkers, both earlier and contemporary, has 
been taken to derogate from their stature,10 and since so much of the scholarly 
work on them has had – and still has – a distinctly celebratory character, 
criticism of such scholarship inevitably appears as the opposite of celebratory. 
The polemical tone has occasionally been sharpened by the fact that there is a 
barely hidden cultural nationalism involved.11 Part of Aarsleff’s thesis is that 
there is a continuous tradition in French language theory from Condillac and 
Diderot through the idéologues of the turn of the century to Hippolyte Taine and 
Ferdinand de Saussure in the late nineteenth century, and that these French 
thinkers and their associates formed important parts of the context in which 
thinkers elsewhere, including the major German ones, worked. Not only has this 
been strongly objected to because of the stature of the individual figures, but also 
because it plays serious havoc with the idea of a distinct historicism in German 
intellectual culture, one that was seen as setting a sharp end point for the 
Enlightenment not only in Germany but in Europe generally, and which in fact 
could be characterised as a ‘Counter-Enlightenment’.12 As Aarsleff himself has 
pointed out, scholarship in this nationalist mode has a long ancestry, going back 
to the nineteenth century and the needs in Wilhelmine culture (and indeed much 
earlier in the century) for a useful past that would set recent German 
                                                        
10 A memorable and amusing case is Sir Isaiah Berlin’s Olympian 
pronouncements in this regard in the London Review of Books, 5-18 November 
1981. 
11 The suggestion has sometimes been made that Aarsleff’s Danishness somehow 
makes him inherently anti-German, which is as ignorant of his work as it is 
offensive to his character – but since we are in the territory of ad hominem 
arguments, I should explicitly declare my own Danishness. 
12 For a recent considertation of this idea, see the roundtable discussion ‘Was 
there e Counter-Enlightenment?’ in Eighteenth-Century Studies 49 (2015): 51-69. 
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achievements apart from shallow Enlightenment thought in France, not to speak 
of British ‘materialism’ and utilitarianism.13 As we now know, also from much 
German scholarship, the historiographical categories that were formed under 
these circumstances have had a remarkable longevity, but it is somewhat 
disconcerting to meet echoes of them in the sort of discussions referred to here. 
After all, what Aarsleff has been pleading for is that there has been a constant 
interchange between French, British and German thinkers, as well as many 
others, in a continuous debate that could serve as a model for contemporary 
intellectual life in Europe. What is more, he has never suggested that nothing 
changed in the decades after the 1790s, he has only objected to seeing this as a 
complete watershed in intellectual history since such a view has blinded scholars 
to the kind of continuities and overlaps of context that alone can explain the 
changes in question. The long essay that forms the centre of the present 
publication is one more concerted effort to make textual and contextual evidence 
speak to the episode that is perhaps the most controversial in Aarsleff’s 
extraordinary story of the study of language as an integral part of intellectual 
history. 
 
 
  
 
                                                        
13 Cf. the literature surveyed in Suzanne Marchand’s contribution, this issue. 
